A look back at the dramatic events that led to the bankruptcies of PROOPTIKI SA and P. SOLOMOS & SIA EPE.
The article also includes videos from critical moments in the history, that gives life and enlighten the description of events that will move many of the participants who lived through these events.
Yet beyond the simple recounting of the events that may be of interest to some of the persons who experienced these events, this article is attempting to touch upon some of the reasons for the bankruptcies of the two companies as well as upon the reasons for the failure of the largest European IT company to survive in the international market, primarily, due to its dependence on just one supplier but also its failure to achieve critical volumes of sales in international and European market, outside its own local market, in UK.
For me, this experience has been a lesson in many areas, such as to develop the foresight and predict, forthcoming technological developments, as well as, to have wider experience in establishing joint ventures, which, in turn will need special competencies to manage and coordinate personnel with mixed skills.
I am sure that similar lessons will be of value to many young or even more mature entrepreneurs who will face, most certainly, greater challenges, of similar nature, in the coming decades.
Nick Kouzos presenting ICL strategy on open systems at Hilton Hotel 1992
1 Introduction
I recently wrote an article about the successes of ICL in Greece, in the context of the general history of IT.
I did not go into detail about IC in this article because it would seem like a part of my own resume, since I started my career with ICL which I served for many years, connected with its history, mainly in Greece, almost to the end, experiencing ,even the consequences of its acquisition by Fujitsu.
For this reason, please forgive me for the fact that the following recounting may resample to an attached extract of my own CV.
However, many elements of a CV cannot include information, judgments and conclusions about companies, individuals and business management practices, so I believe that the text is of more general interest in the history of computing, suitable for the general public as well as for individuals who participated, in the events that led to significant successes but also to dramatic developments, with serious consequences on personnel and the companies themselves during those years..
The history of ICL in Greece is interwoven with the histories of SOLOMOS & Co. Ltd, and Eurodata, representative of SINGER Business machines, and the staff of the two companies.
Unfortunately, a brilliant start ended up with the bankruptcy of the company P. SOLOMOS and Co. Ltd., as well as the bankruptcy of the company PEOPTIKI SA which was a joint venture of the two agents, in an attempt to merge with each other, with the aim of creating a company, adopting similar standards of mergers and acquisitions that Singer Business machines and ICL followed.
I will inevitably refer to my own contribution, since, as I wrote above, I was very much involved in this process, having started my professional career, with the parent company, in England, where I worked, as an engineer in the design and manufacturing team of the new ‘range of computers’ (New range mainframe series 2900) at ICL factory in Kidsgrove UK since 1972
It is worth mentioning that Kidsgrove was the factory where the LEO 1 computer, the world’s first computer used for commercial applications, was on display as a museum exhibit, despite IBM’s contradicting claims about being the first.
There, I dealt with innovative, for this period, systems, such as CAFS, (Content addressable file store) . At the same time I designed, among other things, the ‘Error detection and correction’ system for the peripheral disk controllers (FPC2), of the New series’ 2900 ICL computers.
The periods I will refer cover the decades from the 70s to the 90s.
Perhaps one would say, ‘old sour grapes’, however, I believe that many conclusions can be drawn from this historical recounting , in matters of business administration and in matters of information technology, both of which have had an impact on many countries that even today compete in this space.
2. Status of P. SOLOMOS and Co before its collaboration with ICL (1974-1977)
SOLOMOS company contact me at the ICL factory in Kidsgrove UK. SOLOMOS CO had previously dealt with ‘International Computers and Tabulators’ (ICT), one of the founding companies of ICL, which together with the English LEO MARCONI made up a large proportion of the English computer industry.
P. SOLOMOS had contacts with ICL due to its cooperation in the project for the compilation of the first electoral lists, in the first elections, held in Greece, during post-war period of 1950s.
P. SOLOMOS was a pioneer, at that time, in conventional office organization systems, and tried to pioneer in the field of IT by introducing the first computer in Greece, even before IBM. This first computer was used to solve statistical problems in Greek customs, stories that have been forgotten, but which impressed me, at the time, for the foresight and vision of the founder of P. SOLOMOS, Panagis Solomos, whom I highly respected.
I started my collaboration with the company, under very difficult circumstances for P. SOLOMOS co, because it was at a period when the company had lost the local agency of the German Kienzle Apparate GmbH, a period that I found myself in the incredible situation, having to cover SOLOMOS ‘s contractual obligations, with no trained staff, and no knowledge of Kienzle systems.
The problem was overcome due to the general technical infrastructure I had acquired during my collaboration with .ICL
For the sake of history, it is worth mentioning SOLOMOS’s attempt to cover Kienzle’s gap by importing computers from the American REMINGTON co ,which was manufacturing computers of the type of accounting and billing machines, without magnetic stripes on ledger cards or any other peripherals, except peripherals with punched paper tapes.
Such option, to my opinion, was a suicidal choice for the company to compete with Kienzle or NIXDORF which were the rising powers, in the field of small computers during this period, when most small accounting machines were equipped with magnetic stripes ledger cards with magnetic tape and disc peripherals to replace the older accounting machines.
I am obliged to refer to this period, before ICL’s introduction to the market, because the staff hired and the REMINGTON small installations created a starting point for ICL’s subsequent penetration attempt in Greece, which surprised most competitors in the IT market.
Despite this unfortunate choice, SOLOMOS helped me build a team of programmers to promote REMINGTON systems, creating accounting applications as well as hotel and shipping solution packages to the point that I could say today, they are museum pieces of human effort and proof of ingenuity from novice programmers. , who implemented complex solutions in low level machine code computer language.
These systems were installed in large companies , such as the hotel complexes PORTO KARRAS in Chalkidiki, PORTO ROSS in Slovenia, Rhodos Bay, Chevalier Pallas, Blue Bay, in Rhodes, ADELE MARE, ADELE BEACH in Crete, as well as in shipping companies, DANE, ANEK and NEL, Mr. Papaliou’s AEGIS shipping co, even in Royal Cruise Line Company etc., an inconceivable performance for large company requirements.
3. Entry of International Computers Ltd (ICL) in Greece. Period of cooperation with P. SOLOMOS and co
Despite this success, Remington could not satisfy the ambitions of SOLOMOS co and certainly not mine, who, from the beginning, I was looking forward to the establishment of ICL in Greece, thus, the decision was taken to start the collaboration with ICL at the opportunity to launch ICL’s first mid-sized computer 2903
This leap taken by SOLOMOS, to convert the programmers’ team from a REMINGTON computer environment to a mainframe operating systems environment, was unthinkable for the Greek or any other market.
Despite the difficulties, the activities of SOLOMOS started, in a very short time, creating a team of experts with the employment of another partner from
ICL UK, Savva Savva, who was well versed in ICL operating systems, so we set up the first mid-sized ICL computer in Greece, the ICL 2903.
The 2903 system has been an unprecedented success, since its first year of operation, with successful installations in important companies including the leading retailer, Lambropoulos Brothers, FIX Brewery, Adriatic insurance, AKRON ILLION CRYSTAL stores, MINION department store, the biggest hospital in Greece Evangelismos, ION chocolate factory, the ‘Mother’ maternity hospital, the Greek Sugar industry with 2903 systems, an unprecedented success even at the European level, while at the same time the first Service Bureau, at the offices of SOLOMOS, operated without the use of punched cards, but with the use of Data Entry screens.
But the most important thing was the rapid development of a Software House, almost out of nowhere, that allowed the development of applications for the clients of the service bureau, among which were ERT, the Angelopoulos steelworks, the Onassis foundation-owned Springfield shipping co, Consolidated Contractors (CCC) of Libanon.
From the same software group, applications were developed for other 2903 systems, such as the computerization of the accounting of Evangelismos hospital, and Mitera Maternity Hospital and others, many of which were also replacements of medium-sized IBM systems. An example was the replacement of IBM in FIX brewery and in ION where SOLOMOS undertook the transition from IBM systems to ICL, an inconceivable task at the time.
An event, that significantly increased the reputation of SOLOMOS Service Bureau was the unfortunate terrorist act of destruction with a fire of the largest time Department Store MINION.
MINION was in danger of going bankrupt, not only from the destruction of the building and the merchandise but also from the destruction of the records of suppliers, customers, promissory notes and all forms of accounts.
With the immediate availability of computer 2903 from the Service Bureau of SOLOMOS co and due to the foresight of the head of the computer department of MINION, Mr Lagos, the computerized infrastructure was saved and MINON was relocated to an adjacent building and was reinstated operational within 10 days, a real, historic triumph, which will not be forgotten
The rapid development of ICL in Greece made a special impression to ICL UK, which made me the honor to present ICL’s activity in Greece, at a pan-European internal conference for all Europeans country managers, as an example.
The work of promoting the 2903 system in collaboration with software houses under outsourcing contracts , in addition to its own software house, was particularly highlighted, given that the development of the customer base was taking place faster than the ability of SOLOMOS to develop adequate number of staff ‘in house’ to cover customer needs for application software.
Here, it is worth emphasizing that ICL’s strategy had difficulty to penetrate international market environments, outside UK.
ICL’s growth, based on the domestic market alone, was not enough to support a self-sufficient survival, in the international market, despite the significant technological superiority, in mainframe technology, that ICL, unquestionably, had achieved.
Perhaps, the reason for this was the traditional introvert British mentality, or increasing international competition, or inability to adapt, or all of them.
I will not forget the words of Peter Elis, world Sales director of ICL, who said, at the meeting of European country managers: ICL has the disadvantage of having to rely just on the supply of microchips manufactured from Japan.
He warned, with these words, the impending risk of ICL‘s acquisition by Japan’s Fujitsu.
But that was not all, because ICL’s expansion, in markets where there was no advantage of an existing critical mass of local customer base, required a somewhat, different and long-term penetration strategy, and deep knowledge of the specificities of each market.
SOLOMOS company had a local advantage, due to its long-term pioneering history of Panagis Solomos himself, despite the superior competition from IBM and other mainly, American companies. Hence, Solomos tried to approach important personalities, such as Mr. Pepelasis, president of ’Agricultural Bank, and Mr. Kapsaskis, founder of ‘Ergo Bank’.
In these two cases, unfortunately, ICL did not visualize the importance of the opportunity presented, and got stuck in its own bureaucratic procedures, which did not allow the company to take advantage of an opportunity to enter the Greek banking market, the most important IT sector at the time , which IBM had already monopolized since the 1960s.
Such lack of foresight, on the part of ICL should become a lesson. This may have been the biggest misjudgment of Pan Solomos capability to help ICL make a unique success in a small European country. We lost the business over a small maintenance fee with Ergo Bank.
Of course, ICLtook advantage of another opportunity, later, winning the second largest public tender, funded by the European ‘Mediterranean’ programs (Dellor II), approved for Greece to cover the needs of the 15 largest hospitals in Greece. The Project was shared among ICL with Hewlett-Packard, and Digital.
In this case, SOLOMOS played a primary role taking over the coordination of all three suppliers as well as the Intrasoft Company that had undertaken the project of developing the ‘Patient Medical record ’ software to be applied at a national level.
The project was successfully concluded and delivered, never the less it was only partially paid due the Greece’s inadequacies, leading to the loss of significant amount of subsidy budgets for the health and IT infrastructure for the 80s and 90s. This time the pity is for the Greek administration and the health sector that suffers after more than 30 years.
4. The acquisition of Singer Business Machines by ICL
At this point (1990s) ICL’s international strategy required expansion in products and markets beyond the traditional mainframe market within UK, in order to compete with minicomputer products promoted by most international companies in the wider international market. The trends of the IT industry were moving away from mainframes, introducing wide area networks, distributed systems minicomputers and microprocessors.
After successive failures, ICL decided to incorporate, among other companies and products, the American company Singer Business Machines.
It is well known fact, in the international market, that integrations and mergers of companies is a very complex affair, to achieve integration in both diverse technologies and marketing strategies but even more so for integrate personnel competancies, because often, staff reductions and significant changes in management are implemented.
The problem becomes greater if the merger involves agencies and business shareholders with conflicting interests, customer bases and growth prospects.
In Greece, in particular, the culture of mergers was neither usual nor flexible enough, because it would need good faith and objectivity, as well as experience.
Today, many years later, only e few things can be said, away from the passions that prevailed at the time, which led to serious mistakes made by all parties.
5. The creation of PROPTIKI AE. as a single ICL representative in Greece.
ICL wished to create a company following the steps of the absorption of Singer Business Machines, but did not want to invest in the acquisition of any agent of ICL or Singer in the Greek market.
ICL left the two pre-existing representative companies, SOLOMOS and Eurodata, to resolve the problem on their own, with no intervention.
Such intervention would mean evaluation of the two companies in order to impose an objective and compromising solution, in the interest of both companies and ICL.
An independent evaluation of the two companies could provide a basis for a merger of the two companies or the creation of a new one.
The mistake of SOLOMOS was that it did not seek the involvement of ICL in this negotiation, considering that its size and history, as well as its customer base were self-evident, to ensure a greater participation in the company that would be created, and therefore assumed management control.
From the point of view of the shareholders of Eurodata, Singer agent, such a merger was not acceptable and they requested the participation of a third party, who could play the role of a regulatory factor.
Obviously, ICL did not want to play this role which would require an evaluation of this participation, but also other procedures that would complicate the venture.
ICL wanted an ‘all around’ safe solution.
Eurodata was aware of my intention to join the new company as a share holder, as part of SOLOMOS, as a reward for my successful contribution to the creation of ICL computer division, an intention that had been repeatedly expressed to the management of SOLOMOS, which had not rejected it, on the contrary they favored it, since I had already contributed, successfully, to the creation of the larger customer base of ICL systems, but because, I had also implemented a strategy fallowing ICL standards and formed a team of experienced staff from scratch, in a very short period of time.
Based on this rationale, Eurodata considered that this was a fair and good solution in benefit of the cooperation.
Such participation would be independent of the possible conflicting interests of the remaining shareholders of PAN. SOLOMOS and SIA LTD, since my sole interest, as regulatory factor, would have been, exclusively for the interests of the new company.
SOLOMOS, pretentiously, compromised with this proposition and signed an agreement with me, for the transfer of a percentage of the shares of the company under establishment to me, so that the formation of the new joint venture, under the name PROOPTIKI SA, did proceed, the same evening with the signature of the shareholders of the two companies.
Under the pretence of making a photocopy of the other agreement to transfer the Prooptiki shares to me, SOLOMOS deceived both EURODATA and me, extrapolating the signed agreement.
This document was later found among the papers of the bankrupt SOLOMOS Company. An act nobody expected to take place on part of a company of great credibility.
This action angered me personally, but it also angered the shareholders of Eurodata, as well as the staff of both companies, who was anxious for the preservation of their jobs, their labor rights and the safeguarding of ICL’s future in Greece.
After this event, the relations among the shareholders as well as the staff of the new company, ‘Prooptiki’, and SOLOMOS worsened. Such a bland deception of the shareholders of Eutodata, Nikos Kouzos as well as the violation of the sense of justice, had a very bad impact.
Despite all this, I continued to work, managing PROOPTIKI together with of Eftichios Hatziioannou , one of the EURODATA shareholders, ensuring smooth cooperation of the staff from both companies, expecting a resolution of the problem created by Pan Solomos ltd.
6. Legal dispute, bankruptcy of SOLOMOS and PROOPTIKI
This continued until the moment when I decided to proceeded and claim the shares that belonged to me, based on the agreement that SOLOMOS co signed on the night of the signing of the share holder’s agreement for the creation of PROOPTIKI SA.
In the ‘injunction action’, the main witness supporting my claim, who was Eurodata’s accountant, made an unfortunate mistake stating that Nikos Kouzos was a shareholder, at his request, instead of saying that I was a shareholder, according to the agreement signed in the evening of the signature of the shareholders agreement for the creation of PROPTIKI SA
This was the beginning of the end of PROOPTIKI, as well as the end of SOLOMOS and EURODATA companies
PROOPTIKI’S management team, from EURODATA shareholders, suffered a nervous breakdown and resigned from all board positions so, I personally found myself in the middle of the brake down of both SOLOMOS ltd and PROOPTIKI sa companies
Controversies included lawsuits and clashes among staff and the PROOPTIKI SA became a daily activity..
SOLOMOS appointed a new board of directors that extorted me, from the position of Managing Director, which I had taken over, due to the resignation of Eutychios Hatziioannou.
The new board accused me and all members of the previous board, in court with false accusations for illegal activities and malpractices, the accusations included every penal and criminal act that the criminal code includes.
It was a period that I don’t even want to remember, it was a real nightmare.
Eventually, the new board of directors of PROOPTIKI SA lost the trial against me.
The failure to condemn me in a legal trial, put SOLOMOS in a very difficult situation, because they could not blame the previous board of PROOPTIKI SA, for the conditions PROOPTIKI and SOLOMOS were left. Both companies were collapsing in the hands of the management of SOLOMOS.
ICL itself was not at its best and did not want to take sides in such a controversy, it was looking for a solution for new investors.
No one wanted to create an ICL dealer company or a joint venture, through bankruptcies of two companies.
I personally continued to work for several months, without the new Board of Directors paying my salary and the ‘oxymoron’ was that the only trial I lost was the trial with which I claimed compensation of my wages, over this last period, because, as the court decided, I was… a shareholder.
The touching fact was that PROOPTIKI’S staff was still supporting its customer base, while the bankrupt company’s receiver was trying to protect PROOPTIKI’S staff interests.
Under these circumstances ICL was obliged to find a solution.
7. The creation of the companies ADA and COMNET
With the initiation of the bankruptcy process of PROOPTIKI SA and SOLOMOS, ICL was forced to find a solution.
Here, however, another issue arose, the creeping antagonisms among the personnel of the previous companies SOLOMOS and EURODATA, which, as far as SOLOMOS personnel, they did not want to cooperate under the management of of EURODATA.
There had been reactions, on this issue, from the personnel of SOLOMOS computer department, since the creation of PROPTIKI
The interpretation of such reaction was difficult to attribute to a specific reason, other than personal issues of rivalry, some work issues, but also for reasons of implementing different strategies followed by the two companies.
The computer department of SOLOMOS, followed the strategy of ICL, coupled with the security inspired from SOLOMOS co, while the management of EURODATA did not inspire enough confidence to most employees, for the future of their careers.
SOLOMOS personnel were looking at EURODATA as a closed introverted group whose main characteristic was mutual support, that would not accept any third body to be be integrated or to be evaluated, based on the criteria they were accustomed to, in SOLOMOS, . The strong personality of the EURODATA shareholders was a threat to them and their carriers.
Naturally, it was very difficult for EURODATA to appreciate the problem.
As a consequence of this ongoing reaction, two companies were formed, ADA with staff from EURODATA and COMNET with staff from SOLOMOS
ICL agreed to this unorthodox solution because it did not want to be involved in the bankruptcy proceedings of both SOLOMOS and PROOPTIKI SA.
In order to maintain some coordination of the activities of both companies, as well as to maintain a single image for ICL presence, the two companies accepted the coordination of the activity, regarding products, marketing and sales , to be undertaken and monitored by me, who divided the time of my work between the two companies. It was nearly the same situation that I experienced with EURODATA and SOLOMOS.
ICL saw this extra unorthodox solution with reservations and jokingly called it ‘TIKNICK’, from the friendly diminutives of Eutychis Hatziioannou ‘Tiki’ and Nick Kouzos, ‘Nick’
COMNET was a company that relied mainly on revenue generated out of the customer base of 2903 computers. Hence, most income was coming from maintenance and any software or hardware upgrades of the customer base, which proved the value of SOLOMOS’ fixed and customer base assets that generated a stable income ensuring viability of COMNET.
ADA relied on Singer Business Machines model S25 minicomputer, and on new sales from ICL’s new products, which were mainly focused on ‘on-line’ cash register terminals (point of sale) and personal computers, quatro.
Special effort and investment was made by ADA on two sectors of the IT market.
First in manufacturing and production control sector for medium size Manufacturing companies, where, for this reason, they adapted a product package under the name ‘SAFES’, an excellent international package, adapted and implemented for the Greek manufacturing market
Secondly in retail sector promoting Point of Sales terminals for department stores and hotels promoting an in house adopted hotel hospitality software ‘Welcome’
‘The brochure for ‘SAFES’ Production control package, an excellent international package, adapted and implemented for the Greek manufacturing market by ADA.
ADA initially installed these new systems, mainly Point of Sale, to customers of SOLOMOS such as the ADELE MARE and ADELE BEACH Hotels, the MINION department stores, as well as ANEK Shipping and the cruise ship company of Mr. Panagopoulos Royal Cruise Line. (Golden Odyssey Cruise Ship)
It is noteworthy that the rivalry between the staff of the two companies was possible to be mitigated under the conditions of common interest and cooperation.
An obvious example of such collaboration was the installation of cash registers and the creation of the hotel package ‘Welcome’ that required cooperation of Yiannis Nanos of SOLOMOS and the late Vassilis Trikaliotis of Eurodata.
The brochure that ADA created to promote ‘Welcome’ Hotel Hospitality system
The uncompetitive price of ICL’s personal computers forced ADA to look to Taiwan to import the COPAM personal computer which was an IBM compatible system.
During this entire period not a single Singer S25 was sold, which proves, once again, the importance of SOLOMOS customer base which, if more wisely utilized during this time, would have produced greater success and sustainability.
Despite the successful operation of both businesses, liquidity required new investments that were sought by both COMNET and ADA
Neither company was able to distribute profits until ICL decided to create ICL Hellas.
8. Creation of ICL Hellas
ICL top Management at the opening presentation of ICL Hellas
Eftichios Hatziioannou at the opening presentation introducing ICL Hellas
Finally ICL decided to establish a subsidiary joint venture branch in Greece, not to invest but to cooperate with ADA and COMNET companies, securing 51% of ICL’s shares in the Joint venture company ICL Hellas
ICL took over the general management
Farewell party for Claud Scott
Freddy Grossmayer ICL Hellas General Manager during his 40th birthday
ICL Hellas was introduced in Greece having full support from the top ICL management team with strong presence in many occasions.
The management team included Paul Whitman ICL president ICL International, Barry Caine ICL president International trade, Richard Chamberlain ICL Financial Manager, Chris Stahl ICL Sales Manager as well as Catherine Heam ICL Personnel manager
From the Greek side, were Alfred Grossmayer ICL Hellas Managing director, Eftychios Hatziioannou, ICL Hellas Gen Manager and Nick Kouzos ICL Hellas Marketing and Sales Director.
The Main introduction event was at Intercontinental hotel, subsequent meeting was made on special invitation for a cocktail, aboard ‘Aegean Princes’ luxury cruiser , where Oliver Milles Ambassador of UK was present
ICL Hellas began to operate achieving sales of the ME 29 computer, which was the new version of the 2903, to important customers such as the Higher Court Arios Pagos, the Ministry of Finance, etc.
Further more ICL Hellas participated in one of the most important contests of the Greek government for the computerization of the Ministry of Finance including in its proposal the largest system available in ICL, the system PYRAMID, manufactured by Siemens. Unfortunately the same system, PYRAMID was proposed by an other major European rival, the French company Bull. Both companies purchased the system from Siemens which was the original manufacturer.
ICL PYRAMID system configuration was double in size and consequently more powerful, one of the terms of this procurement was to implement a benchmark the results of which both companies executed.
ICL Hellas summited significantly better results , yet it was excluded from the bid, before the opening of the financial proposal , having spent significant amount of money, the excuse given was that the technical part of the proposal it did not comply with a trivial bid request, to provide a ‘simulator’ program together with the proposal but it was submitted with with the benchmark results.
That was an infuriating excuse. This was totally unacceptable because ICL proposed a double power system from competition at lower price as it was proven after the opening of the financial proposal. The performance superiority had already been proven by the benchmark results.
This was the second time ICL experienced manipulation from the Greek administration. The previous case was with the procurement for the 15 hospitals that was won and yet was only partly paid.
These two projects had the highest budgets procured in Greece, at the time.
ICL’s third disappointment came from the Foreign Office order, which included an ME29 and the implementation of an OFFICE POWER application including the installation of a cabling network, the whole Project was never paid.
Greece’s behavior of the finance ministry of Finance put an end to ICL’S endurance, despite the great success of the sale of a large number of POS terminals to Greek PTT (OTE), Hellenic duty free shops and other sales, including ‘Panafon’.
This period was very close to Fujitsu’s negotiations for the acquisition of the entire ICl, a fact that was not widely known at this stage.
The management of ICL had passed into the hands of accountants who tried to evaluate the performance of the companies based on strict financial criteria, a method that ICL inherited from the American methodology.
ICL’s business management was passed entirely to financial controllers, I remember discussions during management meetings that were not giving any opportunity to discuss various projects, pipelines, market data, staff performance, competition, products, budgets, perspectives and solutions to problems, all these business issues were overlooked as irrelevant to corporation. The only issue that mattered was quarterly figures, which could not be reached from a company selling large computer installations, in a small market like Greece. It was obvious to me that ICL was now interested to go ahead with Fujitsu negotiations.
At this stage Eutychis Hatziioannou convened an informal general meeting of the minority shareholders and proposed that they should agree to hand over their share to ICL, free of charge.
At the same time I was asked by my colleague and friend Eftichios to resign from ICL Hellas, I was stoned and I tried to understand the reason, I understood that our roads were taking different directions , I did not receive a convincing reply, I was forced to resign.
The following events verified my fears, ICL sold ICL Hellas to Fujitsu, for a price nobody knows. Fujitsu subsequently passed the Company to the Austrian STC which finally sold ICL Hellas the Greek company Singular.
Throughout this process, Eutychis Hatziioannou maintained his position and his son’s position in the companies that succeeded ICL Hellas along with its customer base and part of the staff of the original EURODATA, I don’t think anyone from the SOLOMOS staff remained.
It was a sad result for this company. I wish I had convinced my friends and partners to fallow a different approach, in every stage.
After all, ICL Hellas, in any form, could have survived. Look what happened with ICL India, it still surviving
9. Epilogue
From the history I have narrated, I may have made small mistakes in the sequence of events, but the facts are accurate and to the point.
Eventually ICL missed the opportunity to form a successful joint venture and capitalize its presence in the Greek market, while both SOLOMOS and EURODATA, totally lost their assets
I think the story should serve as a lesson for the wrong approach followed by ICL in every step, a legal lesson for sa company law, a lesson for personnel management, a lesson how one should take into consideration changes in technology, a lesson how to approach public tenders, etc.
For me the lesson, I never learned was ‘never trust a friend as a business partner’.
‘He may pull a fast one’ on you, as the old man Panagis Solomos, said to me once.
In this case the staff of P. SOLOMOS KE SIA EPE, which eventually went bankrupt, was the biggest loser, and I am not only referring to the staff of the ICL department of SOLOMOS but also to the rest of the staff who worked for a lifetime in this company that preferred to go bankrupt instead to collaborate with young and creative people who would give life to a naturally aged but pioneering Greek company.
Finally, I will say one thing about Tiki, he remained loyal to most of the Eurodata staff, who together with him retired from the company that today inherited, in any way, the work and property of those who today found other ways to continue their careers and life.
As for me, this period covered the first 25 years of my career which continued in Greece and abroad.
Dedication:
I dedicate this article to my partners in the companies, P. SOLOMOS, EURODATA, PROOPTIKI SA, ICL Hellas, ADA, COMNET, and ICL UK.
I also dedicate it to the lawyers who have represented me beyond their professional obligation, such as the law office of Zisis Kostantinou, lawyer Liberakis and lawyer Anna Maliri
Times for Change 